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I. INTRODUCTION
In Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney
General' Review Authority, former U.S. Attorney General and now Dean
Alberto Gonzales and current Office of Immigration Litigation attorney
Patrick Glen provide a rich account of a longstanding, but little-used
regulatory tool for immigration adjudication: the Attorney General's referral
and review authority.1 Under this referral authority, cases before the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") can be referred to the Attorney General for
decision in three circumstances: (1) the chair or a majority of the BIA refers
the case to the Attorney General; (2) the Secretary of Homeland Security (or
one of her designees) refers the case; or (3) the Attorney General self-refers
by directing the BIA to transfer the case.2 The Attorney General has discretion
whether to accept the referral request. Any decision by the Attorney General
* Assistant Professor of Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.
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1. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy
Through theAttorney General's Review Authority, 1o IOWA L. REV. 841 (2o16). For ease of reference,
the Response will refer to the Attorney General's referral and review authority as "referral
authority."
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1oo3.1(h) (1) (2015).
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on the merits has precedential and binding effect on all agency officials
involved "in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States."3
To be sure, others have written at some length on the Attorney General's
referral authority.4 After all, the referral authority has been around since at
least 1940 and, before that, the Secretary of Labor had plenary authority over
such immigration decisions.5 Ultimately, however, the Gonzales and Glen
article deserves consideration as the foundational treatment of referral
authority because the article painstakingly traces its history and use over the
decades, demonstrating how it has been used by presidential administrations
of both political parties to shape the direction of federal immigration law. The
article's treatment of the referral authority is also enriched by the fact that
one of the authors served as Attorney General-and exercised the referral
authority-and the other presently works in the Justice Department's Office
of Immigration Litigation.
6
As Gonzales and Glen address at length, the Attorney General's referral
authority is a novel and understudied regulatory tool that raises all sorts of
3. Id. at § 1003.1 (g). Compare United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
266 (1954) (explaining that the BIA "is appointed by the Attorney General, serves at his pleasure,
and operates under regulations" that include the referral authority), with id. at 269-70 (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (explaining that the BIA "operates under [the Attorney General's] supervision and
direction, and its every decision is subject to his unlimited review and revision").
4. See, e.g.,Joseph Landau, DOMA and PresidentialDiscretion: Interpreting and EnforcingFederal Law,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 640 n.89 (2o12) ("This certification power, though sparingly used, is a
powerful tool in that it allows the Attorney General to pronounce new standards for the agency and
overturn longstanding BIA precedent."); Peter j. Levinson, A Specialized Court for Immigration Hearings
andAppeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644, 65o (1981) ("The Attorney General's ability to review Board
decisions inappropriately injects a law enforcement official into a quasijudicial appellate process,
creates an unnecessary layer of review, compromises the appearance of independent Board
decisionmaking, and uidermines the Board's stature generally."); David A- Martin, Reforming Asylum
Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1345 n.265 (1990) ("Referrals
are rare, and in any event they are publicly known and visible, thus minimizing the risk of improper
invasion of adjudicative neutrality."); Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and Zadvydas:
Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 271, 288 (2oo2) ("To critics, Attorney
General review of BIA decisions violates the independence of the Board, and (especially when review
is at the behest of the INS) breaches the separation f function between immigration enforcers at INS
and the adjudicators at the Executive Office for Immigration Review."); Laura S. Trice, Note,
Adjudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration
Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1767 (2oo) ("Certification is almost always controversial, in
part because the Attorney General has used the certification power to announce new rules and
overturn longstanding precedent, but also because he often does so in 'a precipitous manner, without
affording an adequate opportunity for parties and interested amici to provide full briefing of the serious
issues involved."' (citing Letter from Lee Gelernt et al., ACLU Imnigrants' Right Project, to Att'y Gen.
Michael Mukasey (Oct. 6, 2oo8), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/imnigrantms/ukaseyletter.pdf)).
5. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note i, at 848-50.
6. There is something to be said for law reviews publishing more administrative law
scholarship that has been coauthored by lawyers who have worked in the bureaucratic trenches
and who can shed light on the empirical realities of the modern administrative state. The Iowa
Law Review should be commended for doing so here.
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questions and concerns about agency adjudication.7 These questions include:
Is the referral power a valid exercise of executive branch policymaking?
Should it be used to create national policy and in the process bypass more
rigorous and public notice-and-comment rulemaking? Should it be allowed
to affect the BIA's decisional independence (if any)? Does it impermissibly
infringe on the procedural rights of the immigrants whose cases are referred
to the Attorney General? These questions merit closer examination; Gonzales
and Glen's article should spark important discussions aimed at answering
them.
This Response, however, will approach the subject of their article from
another angle: The Attorney General's referral authority presents federal
courts with a powerful, yet previously overlooked tool to engage in a richer
dialogue with the agency when remanding cases to the BIA. In particular, this
dialogue-enhancing tool allows the court to exercise a more profound
systemic effect on agency adjudication. Part II briefly sketches out the role of
courts in reviewing agency adjudications and how the ordinary remand rule
can strengthen the court-agency dialogue. Part III then situates the Attorney
General's referral authority within the judicial toolbox for agency dialogue
that I have developed in prior work.8 The Response concludes by encouraging
courts to develop additional dialogue-enhancing tools to escalate issues within
the executive branch outside of this narrower context of immigration
adjudication and the Attorney General's referral authority.
II. REMAND AND DIALOGUE
When a court concludes that an agency's decision is erroneous, the
ordinary rule is to remand to the agency to consider the issue anew-as
opposed to the court deciding the issue itself.9 This administrative law
doctrine has been around since at least the 1940s,10 and the Supreme Court
rearticulated the rule in the immigration adjudication context in a trilogy of
cases in the 2ooos.11 Those cases reinforce that the "ordinary remand rule"
applies to not only questions of act, but also mixed questions of law and fact,
policy judgments, and even certain questions of law.2 This does not mean
7. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note i, at 896-919.
8. Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency
Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (2014).
9. For more on the evolution of the ordinary remand rule, see generally id. at 1561-79.
10. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 3 18 U.S. 8o, 95 (1943) (remanding to the
agency because the "administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the
agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained").
11. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2oo9); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185-86
(2oo6) (per curiam); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002)
(per curiam).
12. See, e.g., Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520 (remanding question of statutory interpretation to the
agency instead of providing an answer itself).
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that courts must remand every erroneous agency decision. It is the "ordinary"
rule subject to exceptions for "rare circumstances."13 These rare
circumstances include when there are minor errors as to subsidiary issues that
do not affect the agency's ultimate decision or when the agency lacks
authority to decide the issue.14
The federal courts of appeals handle thousands of petitions for review of
immigration adjudications each year,'5 and in the last decade alone they have
cited the Court's Ventura remand rule decision in nearly 1500 immigration
decisions.6 In prior work, I examined all of the published federal court of
appeals decisions (over 400) that cite the immigration trilogy since the
Court's 2oo2 rearticulation of the remand rule in INS v. Ventura through the
end of 2o12. Those cases reveal that most circuits, most of the time, follow
the ordinary remand rule. Indeed, the overall compliance rate in the cases
reviewed was over 8o%, though there was much variance among circuits.17
Some circuits were less faithful to this command, with the Fifth Circuit (67 %)
and the Ninth Circuit (68%) among the worst offenders.S
When courts refuse to follow the ordinary remand rule, they often
express concerns that reflect the judiciary's traditional role as authoritative
interpreter of the law and protector of individual rights and due process.
Courts appear to refuse to remand certain issues when the remand would
allow the agency to continue to delay or deny relief when it should not, and
thus result in courts abdicating their constitutional authority to say what the
law is and their duty to ensure that procedures are fair and rights are
protected in the administrative process.19 In one particularly colorful
decision, Judge Sidney Thomas, writing for the Ninth Circuit en banc,
compared the BIA's process to Tegwar: "The Exciting Game Without Any
13. Id. at 523 (quoting Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 186).
14. See Walker, supra note 8, at 1579. Another exception contemplated under the
Administrative Procedure Act is when the governing statute provides that "the facts are subject to
trial de novo by the reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (F) (2o12); see also Stephanie Hoffer &
ChristopherJ. Walker, TheDeath of Tax CourtExceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 267-68 (2014)
(exploring this exception in the tax context).
15. In 2014, for instance, the federal courts of appeals decided 2172 immigration petitions.
John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2014 and Calendar Year 2o 4 Totals,
IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR,Jan. 2015, at 1, 5.
16. This calculation is a conservative estimate based on citations to the Supreme Court's
2oo2 remand opinion in Ventura, 537 U.S. at 12. As of March 16, 2o16, Westlaw KeyCite reports
that Ventura has been cited in 1410 published and unpublished decisions by courts of appeals
over the last ten years.
17. Walker, supra note 8, at 1582 tbl. i.
18. Id. With 154 published decisions in the sample of 342 cases, the Ninth Circuit's 68%
compliance rate skews the overall compliance rate significantly, with eight of the twelve circuits
having a compliance rate greater than 9o%. Id.
19. For further review of these cases, see generally id. at 1585-90.
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Rules."20 Another Ninth Circuit decision compared the application of the
remand rule in that case-where, in the court's opinion, "any remand in such
circumstances would be extremely unfair to litigants, potentially triggering
multiple determinations and repeated appeals"-to "a sort of Zeno's Paradox
in which the arrow could never reach the target."21
Not all courts that express these concerns, however, refuse to remand.
Instead, in the cases reviewed, some courts follow the ordinary remand rule,
but also introduce certain administrative common law tools to engage in a
dialogue with the agency on remand. In total, seven dialogue-enhancing tools
emerged from the cases reviewed, and those tools are summarized in Table 1,
below.-
Table 1: Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue
The Tool The Dialogue-Enhancing Effect
1. Notice of Agency Decision on Signals that court is interested in outcome and continued
Remand dialogue
2. Panel Retention of Jurisdiction Sends message that the panel itself is interested in continuing
dialogue in the event the agency deies relief
3. Time Linit on Remand Communicates strong interest in continuing dialogue by
speeding up that conversation
4. Hypothetical Solutions Not only facilitates dialogue on remand, but expressly starts
the dialogue before remand
5. Certification of an Issue for Remand Suggests an agenda for remand, which helps frame dialogue in
the event of subsequent judicial review
6. Government Concessions at Oral Linits issues on remand and focuses court-agency dialogue
Argument 1
7. Suggestion to Transfer to Different Attempts to change the primary agency speaker in the
Administrative Judge dialogue
For instance, in cases where courts are skeptical of the agency getting it
right on remand, concerned about undue delay, or worried about the
petitioner getting lost on remand, some circuits require the agency to provide
20. Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 368 (9 th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (quoting
MARK HARRIS, BANG THE DRUM SLOWLY 8, 48, 60-64 (1st ed. 1956)). But see id. at 397 (TrottJ.,
dissenting) ("When we exceed our authority, separation and allocation of powers in a
constitutional sense are clearly implicated.").
21. Avetova-Elisseva v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 1192, 1198 n.9 (9 th
Cir. 2oo); accord Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1185 11.7 (9th Cir. 2003) (not remanding
because "constant remands to the BIA to consider the impact of changed country conditions
occurring during the period of litigation of an asylum case would create a Zeno's Paradox' where
final resolution would never be reached" (citing Avetova-Elisseva, 213 F.3d at 1198 n.9)); see also
Christopher J. Walker, Response, How To Win the Deference Lottery, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 73,
83-85 (2013) (explaining how federal agencies can strategically utilize the ordinary remand
rule).
22. This table reproduces part of Table 2 from Walker, supra note 8, at 1614 tbl.2. It excludes
three tools that were not discovered in the cases reviewed but suggested by the author: (1) preliminary
injunctive relief; (2) escalation of issue within the executive branch; and (3) escalation of issue to
Congress. See id.
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notice of its final determination, retain panel jurisdiction over the matter, or
set deadlines for an agency response to the remand. Others suggest (or order)
that administrative judges be replaced on remand, certify issues for decision
on remand, or set forth hypothetical answers in dicta or concurring opinions.
Some circuits, moreover, obtain concessions from the government at
argument to narrow the potential grounds for denial of relief on remand.23
The development of this toolbox for court-agency dialogue advances a
number of important objectives forjudicial review of agency adjudication (as
well as agency action more generally). 24 First and foremost, unlike refusing to
remand an issue-and thus substantively deciding the issue for the agency-
these tools allow the court to remain part of the dialogue on remand while
respecting congressional delegation and the executive branch's law-execution
responsibility. 25
Second, these tools can assist the court in addressing its concerns that an
immigrant may get lost in the process on remand or that the relief may be
unduly delayed or denied. As Professor Hammond observed, the tools can
encourage swifter resolution of cases on remand to the agency-addressing
one of the greatest concerns of the ordinary remand rule and agency
decisionmaking more generally.26 In particular, consider three of the tools
uncovered in the immigration adjudication study: (1) requesting notice of the
agency decision on remand so as to signal the court's interest in the outcome;
(2) retaining jurisdiction over the matter on remand so that the case returns
to the same judges who are already familiar with the case; and (3) placing a
time limit on remand so as to expedite the process. These all signal to the
agency that the reviewing court is interested in a continued dialogue and a
timely (and proper) resolution of the case on remand.
Third, and perhaps more importantly, an enriched dialogue in a
particular case can have systemic effects on agency decisionmaking. Consider
another set of three tools uncovered in the study: (1) providing hypothetical
23. These dialogue-enhancing tools are explored in greater detail in Walker, supra note 8,
at 1590-16oo, as are the statutory and constitutional imits on dialogue-enhancing tools. See id.
at 1601-07.
24. A colleague and I explore these implications in much greater detail elsewhere, in the
context of the Tax Court's review of actions by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). See Hoffer
& Walker, supra note 14, at 2 68-95 (explaining how judicial adherence to the ordinary remand
rule while utilizing dialogue-enhancing tools preserves proper separation of powers while
promoting expertise, consistency, efficiency, and equity on the systemic level).
25. Emily Hammond similarly explored this court-agency dialogue in the rulemaking
context. Emily Hammond, Deference andDialogue in Adninistrative Law, 1 11 COLUM. L. REV. 1722,
1743-71 (2O i) [hereinafter Hammond, Deference and Dialogue] (examining the dialogue on
remand in a variety of agency rulemaking contexts). Professor Hammond also noted that this
judicial toolbox for agency dialogue "extends beyond the immediate context ... to other types
of adjudications as well as rulemakings." Emily Hammond, Response, Court-Agency Dialogue: Article
III's Dual Nature and the Boundaries of Reviewability, 8 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 171, 177
(2014).
26. Hammond, Deference and Dialogue, supra note 25, at 1775.
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solutions in the court's decision to remand; (2) certifying an issue or issues
for remand; and (3) obtaining government concessions at oral argument (or
in the briefing) to limit the open issues on remand. These tools not only help
focus the dialogue on remand, but they also communicate to the agency
specific-and oftentimes even systemic-problems identified by the reviewing
court. Importantly, the tools allow the court to suggest potential solutions for
the agency to implement beyond the particular case under review. The
issuance of written, public judicial opinions allows this dialogue to extend
beyond the immigration judge and BIA member(s) dealing with the
particular case, communicating, for instance, to similarly situated immigrants
and other immigration judges handling similar claims. Indeed, such a public
dialogue can even reach the agency's principals in Congress and in the
executive branch.27
In sum, by remanding yet utilizing these dialogue-enhancing tools, courts
can contribute to a more properly functioning regulatory state where all three
branches of government interact and influence agency action-not just in
agency adjudication under judicial review, but in the agency's adjudication
system as a whole. As Professor Hammond has remarked, "asking agencies to
be equal partners in a dialogue enhances participation, deliberation, and
legitimacy because ... interested parties, Congress, and the courts can more
easily understand and respond to their reasoning."2s
III. REFERRAL AS A PART OF THE JUDICIAL TOOLBOX FOR AGENCY DIALOGUE
In prior work, I encouraged courts and scholars to build on this judicial
toolbox for agency dialogue and suggested three additional tools: (1) ordering
preliminary injunctive relief; (2) escalating the issue to Congress; and (3) escalating
the issue within the executive branch.9 The last tool is most relevant to the
Attorney General's referral authority and is the focus of this Part.
With respect to escalating the issue within the executive branch, I
suggested that courts should consider asking the government at oral
argument to confirm in writing the agency's position on a particular issue as
well as consider ordering supplemental briefing on a particular issue.3o Both
of these approaches force the government attorney to return to the agency to
get clarification, which likely elevates the issue to higher levels within the
agency. I also suggested that a court can escalate the issue within the executive
27. See Walker, supra note 8, at 1610-14 (providing examples).
28. Hammond, Deference and Dialogue, supra note 25, at 178o; see Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 1 OCOLUM. L. REV. 479, 492 (2010)
(" [R] equiring that agencies explain and justify their actions also arguably reinforces political
controls by helping to ensure that Congress and the President are aware of what agencies are
doing.").
29. Walker, supra note 8, at 1614 tbl.2.
30. Id.ati6io-ii.
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branch by the public message it sends in written opinions. I offered the
following example on how this tool has been effective in the past:
[I]n the early 2ooos, a number of circuits in a number of different
opinions expressed serious concerns about the quality, competence,
and caseloads of immigration judges across the country. In August
2oo6, the Attorney General responded to these concerns and took a
number of formal measures to address the problem, including
implementation of annual performance reviews of immigration
judges. In announcing these changes, the Attorney General
expressly indicated that these changes were in response to "serious
complaints coming from the Courts of Appeals, the press, and a host
of other observers."31
The Attorney General's referral authority, however, is a more effective
tool to escalate the issue on remand than merely complaining about the
agency adjudication in judicial opinions. To be sure, as noted in the
Introduction, the referral regulations only expressly provide for certain
actors-the chair or a majority of the BIA, the Secretary of Homeland Security
(or her designee), or the Attorney General herself-to refer a case for
Attorney General review.32 As Gonzales and Glen note, the regulations do not
expressly provide for an immigrant to refer her case to the Attorney General,33
and the same is certainly true of a reviewing court. But as Gonzales and Glen
further argue, "there does not seem to be any necessary bar to [the
immigrant] requesting that he Attorney General certify a case to himself for
review."34 Indeed, in at least one instance (in 1950) the Attorney General
considered a referral made by an immigrant though his counsel.35 And, as
Gonzales and Glen document, third parties have also requested that the
Attorney General self-refer matters.36
In other words, there is nothing in the regulatory framework that would
prohibit a court from suggesting in its opinion that the Attorney General self-refer
and review the case on remand rather than the BIA or immigrationjudge. In that
sense, this judicial referral request is similar to Supreme Court Rule 19 that
31. Id. at 161 1 (footnotes omitted) (citing, inter alia, Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judges Facing
Petfomnance Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. to, 2oo6), http://www.nyflraes.corm/2oo6/o8/o/
washington/oimnig.hnnl (quoting then-Attorney General Alberto R Gonzales)). It is perhaps no
coincidence that the Attorney General who engaged in this dialogue with the circuit courts is one of
the authors of this article.
32. 8 C.F.R. § lOO3.1(h) (2015).
33. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note i, at 853 11.72 (citing commentators who have made
similar observations).
34. Id. at 85 3.
35. Id. at 853 n.73.
36. Id. at 8 53.
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allows circuit courts to certify questions for the Supreme Court review37-a
"certification process" that Justice Stevens has bemoaned "has all but
disappeared in recent decades."3s It also seems analogous to the longstanding
practice of federal courts certifying state-law statutory interpretation questions
to state supreme courts when they are questions of first impression.39 Indeed,
Kathryn Watts has already made this smart comparison between remanding
questions of statutory interpretation to state courts and to agencies.40 In both
circumstances, the higher court has absolute discretion whether to accept the
certification request.
Accordingly, when remanding a case to the agency, courts should
consider including in their written opinion a request that the Attorney
General self-refer the case as opposed to sending the case back to the BIA (or
immigration judge). This dialogue-enhancing tool is quite similar to those
that courts already use in recommending assignment of the case to a different
immigration judge on remand4l or in certifying certain issues for the agency
to consider on remand.42 To be sure, the court cannot order the Attorney
General to accept the referral, as the referral regulations leave that ultimate
decision to the Attorney General and in all events such order would exceed
the reviewing court's authority under the Administrative Procedure Act and
37. SUP. CT. R. 19 ("A United States court of appeals may certify to this Court a question or
proposition of law on which it seeks instruction for the proper decision of a case.").
38. United States v. Seale, 558 U.S. 985, 985 (2oo9) (Stevens,J., respecting dismissal of the
certified question); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years after the Judges' Bill, 1oo COLUM. L. REv. 1643, 1712 (2000) (calling this little-used
certification process "a dead letter").
39. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth 1. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified
Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 385-86 (2ooo) ("Today, forty-five states, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico allow their high courts to answer questions about their law
posed by a court in ariother jurisdiction.").
40. See Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine, o1 NW. U. L. REV.
997, lo25-47 (2007).
41. See, e.g., Abulashvili v. Att'y Gen., 663 F.3 d 197, 209 (3 d Cir. 2o i) ("[W]e strongly
recommend that the agency refer the matter to a different IJ .... "); Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3 d
1044, 1o56 (9 th Cir. 2oo8) ("[W]e suggest that the BIA remand to a different J."); Morgan v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3 d 12o2, 1211 (9 th Cir. 2oo8) ("Given the [passionate and biased] involvement
of the immigration judge in the case, it would be appropriate to assign it to a different
immigration judge."); Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3 d 396, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) ("We urge that,
on remand, a different immigration judge be assigned to any further proceedings."); Shu Ling
Ni v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 439 F.3 d 177, 181 (2d Cir. 2oo6) ("[T [he ends ofjustice would
be better served if, on remand, this case were assigned to a different IJ .... ); Niam v. Ashcroft,
354 F.3 d 652, 66o (7 th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e urge the service to refer the cases to different
immigration judges."); Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3 d 1133, 1141 (7 th Cir. 2003) ("[W]e urge the
BIA to assign a different judge to the [petitioner's] case on remand.").
42. For examples of courts certifying issues for remand, see Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3 d 862,
872 (7 th Cir. 2oo9); Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3 d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2oo6) (per curiam);
Zhang v. Gonzales, 4o8 F.3 d 1239, 1249 (9 th Cir. 2005); El-Sheikh v. Ashcrofit, 388 F.3 d 643, 648
(8th Cir. 2004); MendozaManimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3 d 655, 663 (9 th Cir. 2003).
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Vermont Yankee.43 Notwithstanding, because the Attorney General is a repeat
player in federal court in a variety of legal contexts, the Attorney General-
and the Justice Department more generally-will no doubt give serious
attention to any self-referral request made by a federal court.
Judicial requests for Attorney General referral and review on remand
further the objectives of thejudicial toolbox for agency dialogue discussed in
Part II. These requests maintain the proper separation of powers between the
judicial and executive branches while helping the court protect the interest
of the individual on remand, as well as allowing the court to have a more
systemic effect on agency decisionmaking. In other words, the Attorney
General maintains his statutory authority to decide the issue (or not). And if
she decides the issue, the Attorney General resolves not just the particular
case remanded but establishes binding policy on all agency officials involved
"in the administration of the immigration laws of the United States."44
This lastjudicial objective-the ability to have a systemic effect on agency
decisionmaking-is well served by judicial requests for Attorney General
referral and review. And having a systemic effect is particularly important for
immigration adjudication and in other agency adjudication contexts where
less-sophisticated individuals navigate the agency process, oftentimes without
legal representation. In those circumstances, it is much more likely that
individuals will not seekjudicial review of erroneous agency decisions-either
because they lack the sophistication to navigate the judicial process or have
otherwise procedurally defaulted meritorious claims in the administrative
process. Only by remanding and forcing the agency to correct systemic errors
can the court help these individuals who fail to seek judicial review.
Stephanie Hoffer and I have made a similar point in the context of
judicial review of IRS adjudications:
If inconsistent application of the law by the IRS is confined primarily
to litigated cases and if the Tax Court itself is consistent in its
application of the law, deviation from the APA default standard and
scope of review may further the tax policy goal of consistency.
Conversely, and more likely, if uneven success in litigation is
indicative of a larger intra-agency problem with consistent
application of the law (which might arise from sources such as a lack
of adequate or clear written procedure in a particular area, high
employee turnover, or uneven employee training), the Tax Court's
43. SeeWalker, supra note 8, at 1601-07 (discussing the limitations on dialogue-enhancing
tools imposed by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")); see also Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015) ("Beyond the APA's minimum requirements, courts
lack authority 'to impose upon [an] agency its own notion of which procedures are "best" or most
likely to further some vague, undefined public good."' (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549)
(alteration in original)).
44. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2015).
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exceptionalist stance is of limited use in the furtherance of
consistency. Only a fraction of innocent spouse claimants file
appeals with the Tax Court. As a consequence, if a problem within
the agency gives rise to disparate treatment of similarly situated
taxpayers, it is probable that the court will address only a small
fraction of this disparate treatment. The latter assumptions of more
systemic inconsistencies at the IRS seem much more likely.45
In the immigration adjudication context, we have much more evidence
to support the need for dialogue-enhancing tools to address systemic
problems in agency adjudication. For instance, one recent study found that
fewer than two in five immigrants in removal proceedings had legal
representation,46 and less than half of those represented actually had legal
representation at all of their agency hearings.47 That study also confirmed the
common intuition that immigrants represented by counsel are more likely to
prevail. Indeed, "detained immigrants with counsel obtained a successful
outcome (i.e., case termination or relief) in 21 % of cases, ten-and-a-half times
greater than the 2 % rate for their pro se counterparts. "4 Perhaps even more
important, the study found that, "[a] mong similarly situated respondents, the
odds were fifteen times greater that immigrants with representation, as
compared to those without, sought relief and five-and-a-half times greater that
they obtained relief from removal."49 Although these findings concern
seeking relief before the agency, the numbers are likely similar regarding
immigrants seeking judicial review of the agency's decision.
Likewise, another recent study found stark inconsistencies in outcomes
among immigration judges and the failure of the BIA (and the federal courts)
to correct those individual errors and systemic disparities.5o Among other
things, that study documents how some immigration judges are far more
generous in allowing time for an immigrant to obtain legal counsel than
others, and how unrepresented immigrants are less likely both to win before
the agency and ultimately to seek further review. This study reinforces prior
empirical work that has documented significant disparities in immigration
45. Hoffer & Walker, suprarnote 14, at 279-80 (footnote omitted).
46. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court,
164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015) ("By looking at individual removal cases decided on the merits,
we find that oniy 37% of immigrants had counsel during our study period from 2007 to 2012.").
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 9.
49- Id.
5o. David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2o16), http://ssrn.com/abstract- 256896o.
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adjudication-analogizing the broken immigration adjudication system to
"refugee roulette."51
In other words, in the immigration adjudication context it is well
documented that similarly situated immigrants are not necessarily treated
similarly and that there are great disparities in outcomes that further agency
and judicial review do not presently correct. And perhaps because many
immigrants do not have legal representation, their otherwise meritorious
claims of agency error are never appealed within the agency, much less in
court. As Professor Hoffer and I have more fully explained elsewhere, remand
and court-agency dialogue can help address these systemic problems by
leading to improved consistency and quality of determinations not just in
cases that eventually reach the courts but, more importantly, in the vast
majority of cases that are never appealed.52
IV. CONCLUSION
Among the potential judicial tools for agency dialogue on remand,
referral of cases to the Attorney General may be one of the most effective to
address systemic errors in agency adjudication. After all, as Gonzales and Glen
conclude, "Attorney General referral and review is a potent tool through
which the executive branch can lawfully advance its immigration policy
agenda. It provides both definitive resolution of legal issues and the
opportunity to promulgate binding policy pronouncements on all executive
branch immigration officials."53 When a reviewing court refers a case to the
Attorney General on remand, the court also escalates the issue within the
executive branch such that the chief immigration administrator-the
Attorney General-must decide whether to intervene and establish statutory
interpretations, policies, or procedures that will bind the entire
administration of federal immigration law.
The Attorney General's referral authority is thus a powerful tool in the
judicial toolbox for agency dialogue, and one with which courts should begin
to experiment to enhance their dialogue with the agency on remand.
Moreover, Congress, agencies, and courts should look for ways to develop
similar tools in other agency adjudication contexts in order to allow courts to
have a more systemic effect on agency decisionmaking and a richer dialogue
with agencies on remand. The scope and breadth of agency adjudication may
51. Jaya Ranji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 295 (2007). To be sure, disparities in immigration adjudication have also been documented
at the circuit-court level. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Does the Legal Standard Matter? Empirical
Answers toJusticeKennedy's Questions in Nken v. Holder, 75 OHIO ST. LJ. FURTHERMORE 29 (2014)
(reviewing Fatmna Marouf et al.,Justice on the Fly: The Danger ofErrant Deportations, 75 OHIO ST. LJ.
337 (2o14))-
52. Hoffer &Walker, supra note 14, at 268-95.
53. Gonzales & Glen, supra note i, at 92o.
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be the biggest threat to liberty in the modern administrative state,54 and courts
play a vital role in protecting individuals subject to such agency processes.
Gonzales and Glen identify an important tool-the Attorney General's
referral and review authority-that courts should add to their toolbox for
agency dialogue.
54. See Christopher J. Walker, (Incrementally) Toward a More Libertarian Bureaucracy, LIBR. L.
& LIBERTY (Feb. 8, 2o16), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/incrementally-toward-a-
more-libertarian-bureaucracy (responding to Ilan Wurman, A Modest Proposal for Reforming the
Administrative State, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Feb. 2, 2o16), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-
forum/ a-modest-proposal-for-reforming-the-administrative-state).
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